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Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis
and the Value of Scale
Sharon Marcus
Abstract Through a reading of Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, which readers inside and outside the
academy have valued for decades, this essay teases out how literary critical value is often aligned
with scale: big claims, minutely close readings, and the ability to move gracefully between them.
The essay also identifies and discusses four techniques basic to literary criticism: description,
interpretation, explanation, and evaluation. A coda speculates about the links between Mimesis
and a visual technology introduced into university lecturing a few decades before Auerbach wrote
his magnum opus: the slide projector.
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W hat do literary critics value in literary criticism? Scholars of liter-ature have long paid close attention to what we value in literary
texts, but what we value in criticism itself often remains tacit even for
those writing literary theory or undertaking peer reviews. Through a
reading of Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, which readers inside and outside
the academy have valued for decades, I tease out how literary critical
value often aligns with scale: big claims, minutely close readings, and the
ability to move gracefully between them. Along the way I identify key
aspects of Auerbach’s hallmark style, define some techniques basic to
literary criticism, and speculate about the links between Mimesis and a
visual technology introduced into university lecturing a few decades
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Surface Reading as Description
Several years ago Stephen Best and I suggested that literary criticism, not
least because of the turn to digital methods, was undergoing a shift from
symptomatic reading, which sought to reveal a text’s hidden and for-
mative depths, toward surface reading, in which critics placed greater
value on texts’moremanifest features (Best andMarcus 2009). “Surface
Reading” struck a nerve, I believe, not only because it provocatively asked
readers to prefer surface to depth but also because it challenged the
discipline’s most strongly held values about what makes our work worth
doing. Those values include the political value we assign to scholarship
and the resolutely interpretive status of our scholarly claims, where
interpretive is taken to mean (as I am not sure that it should) unverifiable
or subjective claimsmade by readers defined by their irremediable blind
spots and biases.
Some of the most thoughtful responses to “Surface Reading,” both
negative and positive, elucidated the stakes of the debates it prompted
by moving from metaphors of surface and depth to a vocabulary of
description and interpretation (Love 2010; Rooney 2010). As a result,
instead of quarreling over the aptness of a particular metaphor, we can
address general questions of method and discuss more explicitly what
we as literary critics value in literary criticism. For the past several dec-
ades, the most celebrated literary critics have tended to value interpre-
tation, connotation, and the figurative over description, denotation, and
the literal, arguing that the latter set of terms names operations that are
impossible to carry out. Literary critics often rally around the preferred
terms by casting them as methodological underdogs in need of defense
against an allegedly dominant empiricist positivism that no longer pre-
vails even in the sciences. Although one can count on journalistic dia-
tribes about the humanities to give caricatures of positivism a feeble
but persistent lease on life, physicists since Werner Heisenberg have
declared that there is no such thing as unmediated access to reality,
biologists have asserted that science is drivenmore by the unknown than
by the known (Firestein 2012), and quantitative political scientists have
cautioned that data always have to be or always already are interpreted
(Gerring 2012). In these respects, many scientists and social scientists
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is always interpretation, that denotation can never be isolated from
connotation, and that the literal as such does not exist.
Although Heather Love (2015) is charting the genealogy of descrip-
tive practices in twentieth-century literature and social science and
Cannon Schmitt (2012) is writing the history of technical, denotative
language in the novel, many scholars of literature continue to belittle
“mere description” and to champion interpretation, despite or because
they cannot agree whether to interpret a text is to determine itsmeaning
or to reveal the impossibility of doing so. Literary critics tend to value in
scholarship what they value in literature itself: wit, ambiguity, connota-
tion, vivacity, figurative language, resistance, transgression, and self-
reflexivity about the ways that language and consciousness shape per-
ception and expression.
Might we, however, value description more than we realize? To
explore this question, I turn to a critical text that by any measure—
longevity, number of translations, appearances on syllabi, citation and
commentary by other scholars—has long held a great deal of value for
literary critics: Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis: The Representation of Reality
in Western Literature, first published in German in 1946 and in English
in 1953.
The Style of Mimesis
For a long time I found Mimesis a baffling text. What was Auerbach
actually arguing, and how was he arguing it? What grounded his por-
tentous, gently coercive tone, with its frequent recourse to words such as
tragic, rich, deep, problematic, and serious?Why do readers value this book so
much that its English translation has remained in print for over six
decades?
Oneway to answer these questions is to identify Auerbach’s relatively
idiosyncratic inflections of the critical act, the hallmarks of his distinc-
tive style. At this level of analysis, one explanation of the lasting value of






































1 EdwardW. Said (2003: ix) remarks on the “amazing stayingpower”ofMimesis and
also calls it “by far the largest in scope and ambitionout of all the other important critical
works of the past half century.”
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Italian, German, English, and French, and his magnum opus’s twenty
chapters, occupying 557 pages in the Princeton 1953 paperback edition,
span over two thousand years of literary history, fromHomer and theOld
Testament to Virginia Woolf andMarcel Proust, with erudite discussions
of almost every epoch in between, including late antiquity and the
Middle Ages, periods that rarely receive much attention in studies of
realism. Nor is Auerbach concerned only with the big picture. Although
Mimesis covers territory vast enough to deserve the epithet magisterial, it
avoids the pitfalls associated with the encyclopedic because of its synec-
dochic bent: it focuses on only a few works for each historical period
it covers, and often on only one emblematic passage from each work.
Because Auerbach examines representative passages rather than entire
texts, he quotes less than most critics do, but at the same time he quotes
more, since his exempla frequently run two to three pages, far longer
than the six- or seven-line extracts standard in most criticism.
Like the literary works he values most, Auerbach moves fluidly
between the micro and the macro, zooming in and out from close read-
ings to panoramic surveys and back again.2 A history of “the represen-
tation of reality in Western literature” that proceeds almost entirely by
close readings: Auerbach’s work seems to hold its place of distinction
in the critical canon by virtue of its ability to work on disparate scales.
Given that Mimesis made Auerbach the hero of literary criticism that
he remains to this day, it would seem that as a discipline we like to cham-
pion David but keep Goliath, too, to toggle between the telling example
and big data.
In addition to its virtuosic handling of scale, Mimesis may owe its
lasting allure to Auerbach’s complex relationship to the language of






































2 Stephen Greenblatt (1997: 20, 18) refers to Auerbach’s “powerful ability to
conjure up complex lifeworlds from tiny fragments” and notes that the individual
passages in Mimesis, like the field-note excerpts that Clifford Geertz reproduces in his
essay “Thick Description,” seem “expandable” precisely because they are so “com-
pressed.” Alex Woloch (2014) also notes Auerbach’s shift between the macro and the
micro (122, 127), his use of juxtaposition (122), and the links between the book’s
structure and its claims (124). Woloch argues that critics have overlooked Auerbach’s
contributions to method (113) because they have oversimplified his theories of realism
and representation, and equates both method and theory with form, negativity, limits,
and contingency (116, 127).
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why we value him as a critic. Certain adjectives have consistently positive
or negative valences in Mimesis: rich, wide, full, strong, broad, and deep are
always terms of praise, while thin, narrow, and shallow always have nega-
tive connotations. Tellingly, Auerbach’s values are themselves related
to scale; his epithets suggest that he prefers what is large and dense to
what is small and empty, the river to the rivulet. But although Auerbach
engages in evaluative criticism on almost every page, he refuses to adopt
afixedmeasuring system that would consistently deemparticular literary
techniques positive or negative.Hypo- and paratactic sentence structure,
mixed versus stratified styles, attention to everyday life and creaturely
existence, the arrangement of concrete particulars in an ordered per-
spective: how Auerbach evaluates any of these “motifs” (his term) varies
from one chapter to another and sometimes within his reading of a single
passage. For example, in chapter 4 he argues that Gregory of Tours’s
decision to include a particular anecdote in theHistory of the Franks “shows
hownarrow [his] horizon really is, how little perspective hehas withwhich
to view a large coherent whole” (84), but on the next page the same
anecdote shows that Gregory “is directly interested in what people are
doing [and] . . . treats evenpolitics . . . humanly” (85).3Lackof perspective
both prevents Gregory from adequately mastering the representation of
reality and accounts for whatever success he has in doing so.
If at times the value that Auerbach assigns to an author’s style feels
capricious, his avoidance of a fixed value system enhances his charis-
matic authority as a literary connoisseur who leaves the reader in sus-
pense about his pronouncements: will he approve or disapprove of
Dante’s hypotaxis (178), Cervantes’s vividness (354), Schiller’s depiction
of commoners (439)? Very often the answer is both, which only rein-
forces our sense that we are in the hands of a critic so subtle that we could
never anticipate or reproduce his judgments, which embody the multi-
fariousness he values so much in literary works.
Four other features define Auerbach’s style. One is juxtaposition.
Most of the book’s chapters compare and contrast two, sometimes three,
texts, usually from the same time and place: chapter 2 juxtaposes Pet-
ronius, Tacitus, and the Gospel of Mark; chapter 16, Abbé Prévost and





































37 3 All page citations ofMimesis refer to the first Princeton edition (Auerbach 1953).
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implicitness. Auerbach deliberately withholds any account of his argu-
ment’s stakes and claims until the book’s brief epilogue, which offers a
few pages of retroactive signposting.4Even there Auerbach refrains from
conceptualizing the category of realism per se. “I have not seen fit,” he
writes, “to analyze it theoretically and to describe it systematically” (556).
Instead, Mimesis begins in medias res, with no introduction; the book’s
first words are, “Readers of the Odyssey will remember the well-prepared
and touching scene in book 19, when Odysseus has at last come home,
the scene in which the old housekeeper Euryclea, who had been his
nurse, recognizes him by a scar on his thigh” (3). Throughout Mimesis
Auerbach keeps his claims suggestive, closely bound to the specific
works he discusses. Literary works for Auerbach the critic serve a func-
tion analogous to the milieu or “culture-medium” (465) that sustains
Balzac’s characters but not Stendhal’s. The originalGerman for “culture-
medium” is “Nährboden,” or good soil: just as plants cannot thrive if
removed from the earth, Auerbach’s readings cannot easily be extracted
from the passages he analyzes.
Auerbach’s deliberately gradual unfolding of what never quite
becomes an argument underscores another feature of the book’s style:
the demands it makes on the reader’s time. Since Auerbach refuses to
define his terms at the outset, we can only piece them together by
reading the book in its entirety. (One reason that I initially found the
book baffling was that my professors assigned it only in excerpt.) In the
first chapter, for example, we encounter this pronouncement: Homeric
style has a “need for an externalization of phenomena in terms per-
ceptible to the senses” (6), which I think sounds kind of good, until I read
a few sentences down that externalization leads Homer to represent
phenomena as “completely fixed in their spatial and temporal relations”
(6), which sounds kind of bad—but why? Only in chapter 12 does
Auerbach start to explain the problem with fixity, while praising Mon-
taigne for capturing the flux and dynamism of history. It then takes a
few more chapters for him to make the case for “historism.” Precisely
because Auerbach values flux and dynamism, he refuses to provide






































4 Said (2003: xxii) observes that Auerbach “typically . . . does not take time out to
explain his ideas methodologically.”
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claim predictive validity for the conclusions he draws based on his read-
ings of a “few motifs” in a relatively small “series of texts” (548). Because
Auerbach will not articulate universal rules that hold for the represen-
tation of reality in all times and places, his argument and the values
undergirding it can themselves unfold only over a great deal of time
and space.
In his epilogue Auerbach writes, “It was my endeavor to accom-
modate multiplex data and to make my formulations correspondingly
elastic” (556). Since elasticity and multifariousness also characterize the
works that Mimesis discusses, his emphasis on implicitness and duration
seems part of an effort to render his work similar to the representations
of reality that he has analyzed. Here we have a final hallmark of the
book’s style: it is itself mimetic of the literary texts it studies. Like the
authors he admiresmost, Auerbach embeds the particular in the general
and situates the present in both short- and long-term history. Just as he
focuses on writers who present vivid, sensuous, concrete particulars, he
himself selects and presents long exemplary passages that, as he puts it in
the epilogue, “take . . . the reader directly into the subject” and help the
reader “sensewhat is at issue” (556; emphasis added). Auerbach’s favored
authors do more than present particulars, however; they organize them
into coherent, layered units, and Auerbach does the same, both at the
level of the sentence and over the course of the book as a whole. He
himself explicitly compares the book’s procedure of extractingmeaning
from randomly chosen passages to the modernist fiction he discusses in
its final chapter (548). Even the book’s title is self-reflexive; mimesis
refers both to literature’s efforts to depict reality and to the critic’s efforts
to depict literary realism.
Mimesis as Technique
Scale, connoisseurship, juxtaposition, implicitness, and mimesis are
aspects of Auerbach’s style that help explain what scholars value in his
text, butMimesis continues to be studied not only for its uniqueness but
also for its exemplarity. Another way to understand its lasting value is to
analyze Auerbach’s use of common techniques that the discipline con-
tinues to view as fundamental. To define those techniques, I will take a
page from S/Z, in which Roland Barthes engages in text encoding avant
la lettre by annotating an entire Balzac novella in terms of five literary
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codes: the hermeneutic, the referential, the proairetic, the semiotic, and
the symbolic. In place of those literary codes, which when braided toge-
ther in varying patterns form the network of fictional realism, I will focus
on four critical techniques: description, interpretation, explanation, and
evaluation. I will define each, then give an example of how they operate in
a passage inMimesis.
Description states what things are and how they work; according to
OED2 (www.oed.com, accessed April 26, 2016), the verb describe means
“to portray in words or by visual representation” and “to give an account
of or statement about in speech or writing.” While devalued and con-
troversial among literature scholars, description remains a common tech-
nique in music and art history, where it is seen as requiring training and
erudition. In literary studies, description takes center stage in philology,
narratology, poetics, stylistics, bibliography, and book history, as well as in
some aspects of the digital humanities, such as ontologies, text mining,
and text encoding. Many critics negatively associate description with
tautology (see, e.g., Rooney 2010). Description does rely on sanctioned
forms of tautology, such as quotation, but description also involves acts of
categorization and classification that usually generate a vocabulary more
abstract than that of the objects it analyzes. Thus many descriptive state-
ments in literary criticism correlate specific textual features to terms
drawn from grammar, rhetoric, genre criticism, narratology, and history.
When humanities scholars ask, “Can anything ever really be just
description?,” the question is usually rhetorical. Radical skepticism about
description stems from a tendency to equate it with the absence of any
kind of perspective, viewpoint, hypothesis, or theory.We posit an implau-
sibly austere definition of description, then fault description for being
contaminated by its reliance on frameworks, intuitions, perspectives,
values, opinions, theories, and prior knowledge. Yet frameworks and per-
spectives can enhance perception as well as distort it (see Clarke 2005;
Fried forthcoming). Susan Glaspell’s (1919) play Trifles, first performed
in 1916, is a classic literary example of how a particular standpoint can
produce fuller perceptions and cannier descriptions, in this case of a
murder scene.
Interpretation states not what things are or how they work but what
they mean. The boundaries between description and interpretation are
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everyday speech, interpretation is often synonymouswith opinions based
on beliefs that cannot be proven, on flimsy reasoning or evidence, or on
views that are self-servingly biased (“That’s just your interpretation”). In
literary criticism, there are two common ways to distinguish interpreta-
tion from description. One is to align description with statements that
claim indisputability and interpretation with statements that avow their
partiality. Since most interpretations (even avowals of interestedness)
carry truth claims andmost descriptions are incomplete or situated, I do
not consider this a useful distinction. Instead, I would propose that the
two terms exist on a spectrum.Wemove closest to the interpretive end of
the spectrum when we argue that the text means something very dif-
ferent from what it says or when we assert that a text’s meaning and
import lie in what it does not say, in blind spots and exclusions that only
the interpreter can point out.
Although we are most accustomed as literary critics to the argument
that every description relies on interpretation, viewpoints, and theories,
so too does every interpretation rely on descriptions. Even interpre-
tations that emphasize a text’s blind spots usually rely on descriptive
accounts of what the text itself cannot or will not say. For example, when
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1985: 8–10) interpretsGone with the Wind to be as
much about the rape of African American women (which the novel does
not describe) as about the marital rape of a white Southern woman
(which it does), she relies on accounts external to Margaret Mitchell’s
novel that she treats as descriptive, as saying something about what
Southern society was and how it worked. Her point also illustrates how
descriptions are not necessarily compromised by being made from a
particular perspective or experience. That some descriptions of rape
were made from the point of view of those raped does not vitiate their
reliability but generates it.
Explanation designates the operation by which literary critics assign
causality, though explanation can also signify description and interpre-
tation, as when we “explain” a poem. Literary critics tend to downplay
causality—why is not our favorite question—and usually refer the
sources of a text’s meaning or form to disciplines other than literary
criticism, such as history, biography, economics, philosophy, or neuro-
science. Thus scholars often relate specific features of literary works
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patriarchy, or the structure of our brains. But because explanation is an
undervalued operation in literary criticism, one seen to depend on the
kind of literalism that leads many critics to reject description as impos-
sible, the exact nature of the link between general phenomena and
specific works often remains nebulous. Literary critics are more likely to
posit the relationship between the realist novel and capitalism as one of
homology, analogy, or shared commitments (to, say, individualism) than
they are to trace a clear line from one as cause to the other as effect.
Evaluation involves assessment, appraisal, and judgment of impor-
tance, merit, quality, and social and political effects. Evaluation can tell
us why a text is good or bad, succeeds or fails, is worth reading or not.
Until the 1960s academic literary critics often engaged in explicit aes-
thetic evaluation, but since then assessment of texts’ readability or worth
has migrated primarily to book reviews or to themore implicit operations
of canon formation and curriculum production. Evaluation remains a
strong force in literary scholarship, however, in the form of critique: dis-
approval of or dissent fromwhat a text says ormeans, usually on ethical or
political grounds. Critique can easily be knit into description, interpre-
tation, and explanation: one can disapprove of what a text does or does
not describe, dissent from what it means, protest its underlying causes, or
do all three at once.
To see these techniques at work and to return to the question of what
we value in Mimesis, consider the following sentences, with each tech-
nique tagged in bold:
Just as the locales and the themes change, so too do the styles [DESC;
EVAL; INT]. The predominant style is that which corresponds to the
grotesque theme which serves as frame—the grotesque-comic and pop-
ular style, and in its most energetic form, in which the most forceful
expressions appear [DESC; EVAL]. Beside it, andmingled with it, there is
matter-of-fact narrative, philosophical ideas flash out, and amid all the
grotesque machinery rises the terrible creatural picture of the plague,
when the dead are taken from the city by cartloads [DESC; EVAL; INT].
This sort of mixture of styles was not invented by Rabelais [DESC; EXPL].
He of course adapted it to his temperament and his purposes, but, para-
doxically, it stems from late medieval preaching, in which the Christian
tradition exaggerated the mixture of styles to the utmost [DESC; EXPL;
INT]. . . . From the same spring, Rabelais, who had been a Franciscan in his
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The passage under discussion focuses on an episode in which Pantagruel
takes a tour of Gargantua’s mouth, where he finds forests and a man
planting cabbages in the giant’s teeth, learns that Larynx and Pharynx
are the sources of a plague caused by “a stinking and infectious exha-
lation,” and so on, in an extended conceit. Characteristic of this passage
and of Mimesis in general are the low incidence of strongly interpretive
statements and the high incidence of descriptive statements that trans-
late the specifics of the passage quoted into categories and abstrac-
tions such as locale, theme, style, popular, grotesque, philosophical, and
matter-of-fact, many of which also carry an evaluative charge. None-
theless I have tagged several sentences as interpretive, because on the
page following this passage Auerbach sums up his reading with this
claim: “Our analysis has permitted us . . . to recognize an essential prin-
ciple of [Rabelais’s]manner of seeing and comprehending the world: the
principle of the promiscuous intermingling of the categories of event,
experience, and knowledge, as well as of dimensions and styles” (272).We
thus see retrospectively that “change,” “mingled,” and “mixture” convey a
muted interpretive claim, given Auerbach’s thesis that realism means
capturing historical flux and using a mixed style that treats comic every-
day events with tragic seriousness. That interpretive claim remains fairly
descriptive, since, rather than speculate about what the “essential prin-
ciple” means, Auerbach confines himself here to stating how it works
(through intermingling) and to evaluating it as “promiscuous”—or, as
the German has it, as a “Durcheinanderwirbelns,” a rollicking mishmash
that on balance Auerbach views as more positive than negative.
Like most critics, Auerbach often combines several critical tech-
niques in one sentence. Throughout the passage quoted above he blends
description and evaluation via words such as “energetic,” “forceful,” and
“terrible.” The first sentence also does this, more mutedly; it is descrip-
tive because it tells us what happens in the passage, and it is evaluative
because elsewhere Auerbach equates good representations of reality
with the ability to capture historical dynamism, which also gives “change”
a positive spin. The passage blends explanation and description when
Auerbach tells us that Rabelais borrowed his mixed style from Christian
sermons and adjusted it according to his temperament, and thus iden-
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personality. Auerbach reinforces Christianity as a causal explanation of
Rabelaisian style when he mentions, in another descriptive clause, that
Rabelais “had been a Franciscan in his youth.”
Interestingly, a critical text we continue to value highly relies heavily
on two of the critical techniques we now prize the least: description
and evaluation. Unlike critics of realism writing after the 1970s linguistic
turn, Auerbach spends little time worrying about description’s episte-
mological pitfalls. Instead, as many philological critics did, he sees him-
self as engaged in immanent criticism; as he puts it in the epilogue, “For
long stretches of my way I have been guided only by the texts them-
selves” (556). He expresses the hope that he has “seen” the motifs he
discusses “correctly” (548) and, aware that he may not have, he hopes
that bymaking his units of analysis small enough, he has “report[ed]” on
them “with reasonable completeness” (549).Auerbach’s easewithdescrip-
tion may stem from his willingness to connect it to interpretation, which
he defines in terms of perspective and patterning, as an attempt “to give
meaning and order . . . in the past, the present, and the future” (549).
Indeed, when writing about Woolf, Auerbach faults her for a failure to
interpret that he equates with a failure to describe. He links her narrator’s
frequent expressions of uncertainty to a confusion about reality that
makes it difficult to order coherently, in spatial and temporal perspective,
the experiences and thoughts she describes (535, 538).
Connecting description and interpretation does not, however,mean
collapsing each into the other, and Auerbach clearly distinguishes
between them: description deals with what is in the text itself; interpre-
tation does more. Commenting on what he has just written about a
passage in Don Quijote, Auerbach states, “I have tried to interpret as little
as possible,” by which he means that he has endeavored, “insofar as that
is still possible, to attain a clear understanding of what the workmeant to
its author and his contemporaries” (354). A tragicmeaning “can be read
into the text; it is not there of itself” (358). Precisely because interpre-
tation goes beyond description, the two can be distinguished. Indeed, by
confining his analysis to passages that he reproduces in full, Auerbach
makes it relatively easy to verify whether his descriptions are accurate.
When he offers a paraphrase that does depart significantly from the
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As we have here (intentionally) presented it, [all this] sounds sad, bitter,
and almost tragic.
But if we merely read Cervantes’ text, we have a farce, and a farce
which is overwhelmingly comic. (339)
After alerting us to the inaccuracy of his description, Auerbach clarifies
that it is not a description at all. “To find anything serious, or a concealed
deepermeaning in this scene,”hewrites, “onemust violently overinterpret
it” (345). A good interpretation, by contrast, would remain closer to an
accurate description.
Scaling Mimesis
Although there is more description in Mimesis than we might have
guessed, I am not suggesting that literary critics’ continued affection for
it reveals a disavowed attachment to the description that they only pre-
tend to repudiate. Rather, I would speculate that we still value Mimesis,
despite its reliance on description, because its descriptions so frequently
become occasions for Auerbach to display his virtuosic handling of
scale. To begin with, consider the very different scales of the book’s chief
descriptive techniques: quotation and paraphrase. Auerbach famously
quotes passages that are often one to three pages long; in the US edition
those passages usually appear twice, first in their original language, then
in English, occupying so much space that the book sometimes has the
feel of an anthology. Direct quotation reproduces, in a one-to-one ratio,
the exact scale of the passage itself; its values are accuracy and fidelity. In
some instances Auerbach explicitly devalues doing anything other than
quote a text. In chapter 11 he writes:
I consider it a mistake to probe Rabelais’ hidden meaning . . . for some
definite and clearly outlined doctrine; the thing which lies concealed in his
work, yet which is conveyed in a thousand ways, is an intellectual atti-
tude. . . . To describe it in more detail is not a wise undertaking—for one
would immediately find oneself forced into competition with Rabelais. He
himself is constantly describing it, and he can do it better thanwe can. (281)
Because nothing can improve on Rabelais’s descriptions, Auerbach
refrains not only from interpreting thembut even fromdescribing them,
confining himself instead to whatever self-description Rabelais himself
offers.
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Long block quotations often set the stage for Auerbach to wrap up
his analysis with a masterful condensation. Here the value derives from
the difference in scale between a wordy, quite specific literary passage
and a pithy but wide-ranging critical statement. For instance, in chapter
19, after a very long paraphrase of an even longer passage from Zola’s
Germinal, Auerbach provides this compressed summary: “Crude and
miserable pleasures; early depravity and rapid wearing out of human
material; a dissolute sex life, and a birth rate too high for such living
conditions, since intercourse is the only amusement that costs nothing;
behind all this, at least among the most energetic and intelligent, revo-
lutionary hatred on the verge of breaking out— these are the motifs of
our text” (511–12). Auerbach gives us, condensed into a single sentence,
an abstract of the quoted passage that also describes the entire novel
from which it is drawn, then vaults to the naturalist literary project
writ large and to the historical conditions that explain the characters’
motivations.
As striking as Auerbach’s liberal use of long quotations is his ability to
comment on them for pages in analyses that exhibit his talent for elab-
oration or amplification of the passage under discussion.5 Auerbach
demonstrates howmuch the critic can say about what a passage is doing,
crudely measured as the difference in size between the quoted text and
the critic’s analysis of it. His discussion of the Song of Roland, for example,
begins with a long quotation, next paraphrases the passage’s plot points
along with some earlier ones, and finally provides a second description
that aligns plot points and formal features: “The first laisse [strophe]
begins with an introduction of three lines, three paratactically juxta-
posed principal clauses which describe the early-morning departure of
the army” (99). In other instances, Auerbach disaggregates what the text
combines, as when he writes of a passage in Montaigne: “We will now
discuss these seven points individually. This to be sure is a somewhat
meager expedient, if only for the reason that the points intermingle and
are hard to keep apart. But it is necessary if one desires to get out of the
text everything that is in it” (297). Here Auerbach presents critical





































37 5 See, for example, his treatment of a passage in a Goncourt brothers novel (496).
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it describes; it is a “meager expedient” that nonetheless manages to
extract everything that Montaigne’s juicy text has to offer.6
Auerbach thus invests description with one of interpretation’s most
dazzling features: the power to shift scales.7 The long passages he quotes
at the outset of each chapter represent much larger texts and corpora in
miniature. His discussions of those passages shift scale even more dra-
matically, since his elaborate analyses amplify the small into the large,
while his concentrated summaries compress the large into the small.
This value, however, comes through in how Auerbach deploys descrip-
tion, not in how he himself describes it. Indeed, Mimesis presents an
interesting paradox: although Auerbach values description enough as a
critical technique to use it liberally throughout his magnum opus, he
displays ambivalence about description in literary works.
To understand what Auerbach does and does not value about lit-
erary description requires a quick survey of his literary value system. His
overarching interest throughout Mimesis is literature’s ability to invest
ordinary people and everyday life, usually the stuff of comedy, with tragic
seriousness (282). He therefore demotes writers like Racine and Cor-
neille, who use elevated language to focus on the nobility, and consis-
tently admires what he calls “the mixed style” (41) of authors such as
Shakespeare, who blends high and low language; Boccaccio, who uses
high language to discuss low subjects; and works such as the New Tes-
tament, whose humble language “reaches out far beyond its original
domain, and encroaches upon the deepest and the highest, the sublime
and the eternal” (72). Auerbach also values “Historism” (443–44), which
he defines characteristically late in the book in a page-long sentence that
performs the complex coordination of multifariousness it describes.
ElsewhereAuerbachdefines historismmore compactly as “a loving genetic
comprehension of evolutions” (465) that sees the past in “perspective,” in
“historical depth” (321), and conceives “the present as history— the
present as something in the process of resulting from history” (480). It
follows that Auerbach values literary works that span different scales,
that can represent change and flux (28), and that have a sense of their
own historical scale, of their place in a long temporal chain.
6 Auerbach on Montaigne: “No philosopher of antiquity . . . could write . . . so
juicily, so animally and so spontaneously” (295).
7 On interpretation’s association with shifts in scale, see Felski 2015: 61, 62, 70.
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Because the dynamic historical forces that structure everyday life are
not visible as such, Auerbach valorizes texts that “embed” inner events
“in concrete contemporary reality” (72). This is where description
comes in, but Auerbach praises the sensory, the visual, the graphic, the
random, the particular, and the concrete only when they also figure
something higher and deeper. Equally important to Auerbach is that
those “deep subsurface layers” are always on the move (45). He thus
favors literary works that set random, sensory, concrete particulars in
motion, because, like leaves tracing the wind, such details help read-
ers grasp history as a set of invisible but determining “forces” (32).
“Real life and living growth” (119), “progressive movement” (118),
fullness (118), elasticity (112), freedom (111, 128), and development
(159): these represent, as personifications, some of Auerbach’s highest
aesthetic values.
Left to their own devices, however, the concrete pictorial details that
constitute description degree zero can degrade texts and readers; the
only exception to this rule is Montaigne, who earns Auerbach’s highest
praise even though his method “confines itself to pure observation”
(299). For Auerbach, the descriptive otherwise acquires value only when
it paves the way for the interpretive, not in the sense of uncovering
hidden meaning or exposing the limitations of a particular view but in
the sense of providing a coherent image. Good description must, like
“Dante’s figural interpretation” of the inferno, depict a world “ordered,
interpreted, and represented as a reality and as a whole” (231); the small
must be clearly framed by and positioned within a much larger unity. By
contrast, a passage drawn from the Roman historian Ammianus Mar-
cellinus shows “how much stronger the magical and the sensory has
become at the expense of the human and the objectively rational” (53).
After underscoring Ammianus’s preference for “sensory vividness” (58),
the “gestural” (54), the “graphically imaged” (54), and the “pictorial”
(57), Auerbach concludes: “In Ammianus the sensory, the perceivable,
runs riot. . . . With glittering words and pompously distorted construc-
tions language begins to depict the distorted, gory, and spectral reality of
the age” (57). Ammianus’s style succeeds at mimesis, since its “effects are
as distorted as the reality it represents” (59). But Auerbach, subjecting
description to evaluation, ultimately faults Ammianus’s writing and
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writing history nowhere displays anything redeeming, nowhere anything
that points to a better future, nowhere afigure or an act about which stirs
the refreshing atmosphere of a greater freedom, a greater humanity”
(59–60).
While even this “glaringly pictorial realism” contains the germ of the
mixed style (63) that Auerbach considers the signal marker and achieve-
ment of realism, the message is clear here as throughout: description
alone has no redeeming value.8 Homer’s characters “are splendidly
described” (17), but this turns out to be a demerit; precisely because “the
Homeric poems conceal nothing, they contain no teaching and no
secret second meaning” (13). Auerbach prefers descriptions that lead
to interpretations: “Homer can be analyzed . . . but he cannot be inter-
preted” (13). Description and interpretation must be kept in balance,
however, since too much interpretation unmoors writing from the real,
as in Rousseau, whose emphasis on philosophy and principles means
that “the reality of the social world does not become for him an imme-
diate subject” (466).
If description and interpretation exist on a spectrum, that spectrum
is a scaled one: description, with its enumeration and proximity to par-
ticulars, tends to feel small, where interpretation, with its leaps and
excavations, usually connotes an increase in scope. Description tarries in
the sensory and the particular, while interpretation uses the author’s
“intellectually categorizing power” (258) to give those particulars a form
that elicits their connections and carries us to broader, deeper, higher
realms. Auerbach values description most when authors use it to move
from the small, the particular, the visible, and the low to the great, the
general, the invisible, and the universal. His preferred point is where the
common reaches the high and the high meets the common (see, e.g.,






































8 Auerbach similarly faults Cervantes: “Don Quijote’s adventures never reveal any
of the basic problems of the society of the time. His activity reveals nothing at all. It
affords an opportunity to present Spanish life in its color and fullness” (345). He
continues: “In the resulting clashes between Don Quijote and reality no situation ever
results which puts in question that reality’s right to be what it is” (345). In Cervantes, too
much realism; in the English novel, toomuch idealism (520), by whichAuerbachmeans
too much attachment to a fixed moral system instead of a supple one that responds to
historical particularity and flux.
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transition from the concrete to the abstract or figurative but also a dra-
matic shift in scale.
Auerbach is the Goldilocks of literary criticism, constantly assessing
whether a work’s scale is too big or too small, too interpretive or too
descriptive, and almost never finding that any writer gets the balance just
right. He is also Alice in Wonderland, vaulting from the tiny to the
gigantic and back again. He values description and interpretation not
as two sides of the same coin but as distinct operations that attain the
highest value when combined. As a good humanist, Auerbach also val-
ues, and mimetically models for his reader, a mental and linguistic
elasticity that allows author and reader to move freely between descrip-
tion and interpretation, between the small scale of the part and the vast
scale of the whole (see 488, 53).
Coda: Auerbach’s Slide Table
The choice of as old-fashioned a text as Mimesis to think through ques-
tions of scale and valuemay seemperverse, given the urgency with which
many literary scholars today are thinking about how new computational
methods that can analyze unprecedented amounts of text might trans-
form literary criticism. Comparing what Auerbach does in Mimesis to
digital methods would require another essay entirely, an exploration of
what, if anything, changes when criticism shifts from duration to speed,
implicitness to explicitness, exemplarity to large corpora.9 It is easy to
cast Auerbach as the traditionalist in this scenario, not only because he
wrote so long ago but also because throughoutMimesis he questions the
value of “the searchlight device,”which “consists in overilluminating one
small part of an extensive complex, while everything else which might
explain, derive, and possibly counterbalance the thing emphasized is left
in the dark” (404). AlthoughAuerbach finds the device in antiquity, I am
probably not the only one to hear an allusion to Nazi propaganda
techniques in the figure of an aggressive “searchlight” that obscures






































9 Using Docuscope,MichaelWitmore (2016) shows that Auerbach’s claims for the
passages he quotes in his first chapter continue to hold up if one extends the range of
analysis to all the books of the Odyssey and the New Testament.
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Elsewhere Auerbach uses a related metaphor when he writes of
a speaker in the Satyricon that “a clear and equal light floods the per-
sons and things with which he deals. . . . What he says can have but one
meaning, nothing is left mysteriously in the background, everything
is expressed” (26–27). Here the illumination is not selective but total,
under “a clear and equal light,” yet it produces the same oversimplifi-
cation, reduction to “one meaning,” and has the same connotations of a
brutalmodernity, fromwhichAuerbach recoils asmany initially did from
the perceived harshness of electric lightbulbs. Auerbach’s disdain for
crude, aggressive lighting comes through even when he uses epithets
that ordinarily register as quite positive: he prefers the story of Abraham
and Isaac to Homer’s “orderly, perfectly well-articulated, uniformly illu-
minated descriptions” (3) and dismisses Cervantes for rendering Don
Quijote’s madness as if it possessed “a bright equanimity” that “illumines
everything that crosses his path” (352). To the harsh glare that makes
everything visible, Auerbach prefers shadowy, dappled images that leave
something “mysteriously in the background” (26).
Another now obsolete visual tool that was shiny and new when
Auerbach was writing Mimesis also seems to be at stake here: the 35mm
three-color slide projector that, by sending light through glass slides,
made the resulting images seem radiantly luminous, suffused with light.
In the years when Auerbach was writing Mimesis, color slides were the
latest thing, pushing out the black-and-white photographic slides that in
the early twentieth century had in turn replaced older, hand-painted
lantern slides (Widzinski 2010: 359–60). In 1882 art historians at Prin-
ceton, Harvard, and Columbia began to use lantern slides in college
lectures, contributing to a shift from the supernatural to the scientific,
from the magic-lantern slides of traveling showmen and popular lec-
turers to the scientific microscope—although both uses purported
to reveal the unseen (Eisenhauer 2006: 200, 204–5). In Germany the
art historians BrunoMeyer andHermannGrimmpaved the way in the
1880s for the magisterial photographic-slide lectures that Heinrich
Wölfflin offered in the first decade of the twentieth century (Miyahara






































10 Snow mistakenly names Grimm Heinrich instead of Hermann in her article.
The foundational article on the slide projector’s role in art history is Fawcett 1983.
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Mimesis, color slides were to lantern slides and black-and-white photo-
graphic slides what PowerPoint would be fifty years later to the Kodak
carousel: the garish new format casting the older one in a nostalgic glow.
One is tempted to imagine Auerbach fulminating against this
new technology, which often produced the kind of even, bright light-
ing he objects to in the examples quoted above, but his signature criti-
cal techniques bear some interesting correspondences to what was at the
time a relatively new instructional technology. Like a projector that
enlarges a small slide into an image that fills a large screen, Auerbach’s
criticism magnifies passages so that they represent entire texts and his-
torical periods, while treating those passages like the details that slides
enabled art historians to isolate from larger images. Like Wölfflin, who
pioneered the use of double-slide projectors in the early twentieth cen-
tury, Auerbach operates by juxtaposition and comparison, placing two
texts side by side to highlight their similarities and differences.11 Finally,
like the art historian placing slides on a light table or lining up slides to
organize a lecture, Auerbach gives us a history of Western literature in
roughly forty textual vignettes. To be sure, this procedure is not purely
modern; it also resembles Auerbach’s description of the structure of the
Song of Roland, which “strings independent pictures together like beads,”
so that each “has as it were a frame of its own” (115), and composes events
“into a mosaic of parceled pictures . . . placed side by side paratactically”
(116). This resembles not only the relationship between the long extracts
that often sit like rectangular slides on the pages of Mimesis but also the
paratactic relationship between the book’s chapters, which rarely explain
how or why literature changes from one era to the next. Indeed, the slide
projector owes something not only to episodicmedieval poetry but also to
the medieval cathedral, whose stained-glass windows each resemble
freestanding slides but, when viewed collectively and sequentially, tell a
story that unfolds like a slide show.
Fawcett and Robert S. Nelson (2000) note that the technique of placing two images
side by side, whether as print enlargements or in specially fabricated slide projectors,
predated Wölfflin but agree with Anne Friedberg (2006: 196) that “the comparative
method of the double-slide projector” was closely associated with Wölfflin, who made
it one of his “pedagogical mainstays . . . soon after he began to lecture at the Uni-
versity of Berlin in 1901.”
11 On the history of double-slide projection and for brief comments on the analysis
it enabled, see Friedberg 2006: 195–96.
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I conclude with this speculative vision of Mimesis as a slide table to
suggest that new methods of reading, writing, illustration, and printing
can informhow we read even when we ostensibly reject them. Awareness
of new technologies alerts us to how we take in information and how we
express our insights, making us more self-conscious about our descrip-
tive and interpretive techniques. Just as slide projectors created copies
that weremore accurate than engravings and lithographs (Fawcett 1983:
450) and allowed people to see more in a painting, to focus more on
details and to seek out the compositional structures that different can-
vases had in common, basic computer functions such as word searches
allow us to see more in texts. At the end ofMimesis Auerbach writes that
he chose most of his texts at “random” (556), a term that recalls his
description of Stendhal’s equally random “method,” which he deems
“the best for eliminating the arbitrariness of one’s own constructions,
and for surrendering oneself to reality as given” (462–63). Auerbach
does not favor any simple surrender to reality, however, since he criticizes
Cervantes precisely for never putting “in question . . . reality’s right to be
what it is” (345). An attempt to synthesize these apparently contradictory
evaluations would go something like this: critics and authors should not
accept reality as given, but to understand the reality one might want to
change, one must first passionately observe it.
New technologies, from the book to the slide projector to the
computer, can improve our observation of sensory particulars, enabling
us to see better what is already there, to visualize a previously unseen
realm, and to perceive more in a single work or in a vast corpus than we
ever have before. Sometimes, however, theymight also lead us to see less.
John Ruskin agreed that photographs of paintings could direct viewers
to see details they might otherwise miss, but he also felt that they were
often less successful than sensitive engravings at capturing “certain
expressive qualities of the original” (Fawcett 1983: 451). As new tech-
niques and styles of literary analysis emerge, our first impulse is to focus
on how they might improve on older ones, yet we can also think of
new techniques as incorporating and updating older ones or being
informed by them, as renewing our appreciation for the older ones, or as
encouraging us to hastily and heedlessly abandon the old in favor of
the latest shiny thing. New media, new methods, and new techniques






































Marcus n Mimesis and the Value of Scale 317
MLQ773_02Marcus_1pp.3d 05/20/16 10:10am Page 317
print enabled multiple copies of books to spread language, images, and
ideas faster and farther than manuscripts, and the slide lecture allowed
viewers to compare and contrast parts and wholes, so too digitalmethods
are spawning new ways of reading whose potential we have only begun to
tap. Yet, as Auerbach’s frequentmeditations onhistoricalflux remindus,
every advance risks loss: our vision of literary criticism’s exciting new
future will do well to include the shadows that new ways of reading cast
on older ones—shadows that dapple, outline, or obscure, depending on
how we adjust our vision.
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